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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
POSTCONVICTION PROCEDURE
Cheney C. Joseph, Jr.*
DIRECTED VERDICT-TOTAL LACK OF EVIDENCE
In State v. Patterson,' the supreme court set aside defendant's
conviction of manslaughter and ordered the trial court to enter a
judgment of acquittal, finding a total lack of evidence to prove that
the defendant's actions were not justified under article 20 of the
Louisiana Criminal Code.2 The Patterson court followed the rule of
State v. Douglas3 that the trial court may grant a directed verdict in
a jury case only when the state fails to present any evidence of the
crime or an essential element thereof.
The facts of Patterson are significant. The defendant and the
decedent attended a social event which resulted in an encounter be-
tween the two men. Decedent drew a knife and chased defendant.
Following defendant's escape, decedent apparently returned because
a subsequent encounter and chase took place. The defendant then
fled to his automobile, with the decedent following in pursuit. Defen-
dant obtained a shotgun from the trunk of his car and warned dece-
dent to stop. When decedent disregarded the warning and advanced,
defendant fired a shot, killing him. Summarizing the evidence pre-
sented, the court said that after reviewing the testimony of the state's
witnesses, it could not find "one shred of evidence that the homicide
was not justifiable." 4
The court based its reversal on two significant determinations.
The first is that the state bears the burden of proving that a homicide
is not justifiable.' The second is that the court has constitutional
authority to reexamine the jury findings that the defendant did not
"reasonably believe that he [was] in imminent danger of losing his
life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing [was] neces-
sary to save himself from that danger. . . ." From the standpoint
*Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 295 So. 2d 792 (La. 1974).
2. LA. R.S. 14:20 (1950) provides in part: "A homicide is justifiable: (1) When
committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent
danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary
to save himself from that danger ..
3. 278 So. 2d 485 (La. 1973).
4. 295 So. 2d at 794.
5. Id. See also State v. Carter, 227 La. 820, 80 So. 2d 420 (1955); State v. Thorn-
hill, 188 La. 762, 178 So. 343 (1938); State v. Disotell, 181 La. 149, 158 So. 825 (1934).
State v. Richardson, 175 La. 823, 144 So. 587 (1932); State v. Conda, 156 La. 679, 101
So. 19 (1924).
6. LA. R.S. 14:20(1) (1950).
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of appellate review of a trial court's refusal to grant a directed verdict,
the second determination is particularly interesting in view of the
court's earlier decision in State v. Brewer' and later decision in State
v. Jones.'
Under Article VII, § 10 of the Constitution of 1921, the supreme
court's appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases extends to questions
of law alone. Article V, § 5 of the Constitution of 1974 continues this
rule. However, the court has held that total lack of evidence is a
question of law, and is therefore properly an issue on appeal.9
In State v. Brewer,0 affirming the refusal of a trial judge to
provide an indigent appellant with certain portions of transcript, the
court justified its finding that no error had been committed with the
following:
In our state, the scope of appellate review in criminal matters
covers 'questions of law alone'. Determination of the factual ques-
tions of guilt or innocence, such as whether or not the defendant
acted in self defense or in the heat of passion upon provocation,
or was under the influence of alcohol, as he alleges inter alia, is
within the sole province of the jury."
In State v. Jones, 2 the defendant was prosecuted for negligent
homicide 3 in connection with an automobile accident in which defen-
dant, attempting to pass another car, was forced to pull quickly back
into his lane of traffic due to the approach of another vehicle from
the opposite direction. The right front of defendant's car struck the
left rear of the other car, apparently causing the other car to leave
the roadway. A passenger in the other car was killed. The court noted
that there was no evidence that the defendant had taken any intoxi-
cants.
Analyzing the concept of criminal negligence," the court said
that it was "clear that proof of ordinary negligence does not consti-
tute proof of criminal negligence"' 5 and that the state was required
7. 263 La. 113, 267 So. 2d 541 (1972).
8. 298 So. 2d 774 (La. 1974).
9. See, e.g., State v. Douglas, 278 So. 2d 485 (La. 1973).
10. 263 La. 113, 267 So. 2d 541 (1972).
11. Id. at 122, 267 So. 2d at 544. (Emphasis added.)
12. 298 So. 2d 774 (La. 1974).
13. LA. R.S. 14:32 (1950).
14. LA. R.S. 14:12 (1950) provides: "Criminal negligence exists when, although
neither specific nor general criminal intent is present, there is such disregard of the
interest of others that the offender's conduct amounts to a gross deviation below the
standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful man under like
circumstances."
15. 298 So. 2d at 776.
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"to show more than a mere deviation from the ordinary standard of
care."'" Although the state's case did support the finding that the
defendant's negligence caused the accident, this was at best only
ordinary negligence. Finding a total lack of evidence of criminal neg-
ligence, the court reversed and remanded to the trial court to enter
an order of acquittal.
Two earlier cases, neither of which is cited in the court's opinion,
confronted the same problem. In State v. Minor,'7 the court affirmed
the defendant's conviction of negligent homicide, resulting from an
auto wreck. The court, reviewing all of the evidence, found "some
evidence adduced which could well justify the conclusion that the
collision and death in question resulted from criminal negligence on
the part of this defendant."' 8
The court in Minor distinguished its earlier decision in State v.
Harrell." In Harrell, again a negligent homicide prosecution resulting
from an automobile accident, the defendant, a seventeen year-old,
struck a child who ran into the street. Although the court found that
the defendant's conduct in operating his vehicle in the manner in
which he did at the time of the accident constituted "an error of
judgment. . . . it [was] not criminal negligence so as to warrant a
conviction."20
Although the court recognizes and discusses a distinction be-
tween total lack of evidence and insufficiency of evidence, it becomes
very difficult to distinguish between these two concepts when the
court is dealing with such findings as "gross deviation below the
standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful
man under like circumstances"2' or the defendant's reasonable belief
16. Id.
17. 241 La. 339, 129 So. 2d 10 (1961).
18. Id. at 342, 129 So. 2d at 11-12. The facts are of interest: "[A]t and near the
site of the accident (and at the time thereof) U.S. Highway 51, constructed with a
black top surface, was undergoing repairs, was bumpy, and was exceedingly wet be-
cause of rain. Between that point and Ponchatoula to the north were signs warning
that the road had a speed limit of 45 miles per hour and was 'slick when wet'. Further,
one E.M. Wegmann testified that while he was driving his automobile in a southerly
direction at approximately 43 miles per hour and was following another car about 100
feet ahead, the defendant steered his Mercury into the left lane, passed the mentioned
two vehicles very quickly and at a speed considerably faster than they were traveling,
cut sharply to the right when 'just barely ahead of the front car' and went completely
off the road, and then 'cut back across (the highway's center) at about a 75 degree
angle', thereby causing his machine to strike the Willys station wagon which was
proceeding toward the north in its proper traffic lane." Id. at 342-43, 129 So. 2d at 12.
19. 232 La. 35, 93 So. 2d 684 (1957).
20. Id. at 38, 93 So. 2d at 685-86.
21. LA. R.S. 14:12 (1950).
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that "he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great
bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from
that danger."2
In Jones and Patterson, the court was willing to review the facts
in the record under the total lack of evidence standard. The court did
not, as suggested in Brewer, simply view such questions as within the
sole province of the jury. What "total lack of evidence" means to the
supreme court in a particular case will depend upon an analysis of
the circumstances of that case. Clearly the concept does not envision
the court's engaging in credibility choices. However, distinguishing
between "mere insufficiency" on the one hand and "total lack of
evidence" on the other demands a full review of all of the evidence,
particularly in such cases as those discussed where the issue is
whether there is "any evidence" on the issue of "reasonableness."
Since the court has embarked upon an area that requires careful
review of facts, it seems that in such cases the court's inquiry comes
close to examining the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
verdict of a reasonable jury rather than applying the standard of a
total lack of evidence. Although the court in State v. Douglas said
that "[i]n Louisiana . . .insufficiency of evidence is not a question
of law and may not be reviewed by this court,"2" Jones and Patterson
show how that distinction can become blurred.
DIRECTED VERDICT-STANDARD FOR TRIAL COURTS
State v. Douglas" interpreted article 778 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure so as to partially overrule State v. Hudson,25 which held
that the directed verdict in jury cases was unconstitutional. Douglas
recognized a limited application of directed verdicts to jury trials.
The court held that the statutory authority of the trial court to direct
a verdict of acquittal "if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
conviction"26 refers to a situation where the state has produced no
evidence to prove an essential element of the crime. In such a situa-
tion an acquittal is in order because total lack of evidence is a ques-
tion of law, and thus no issue of fact is taken from the jury.
The 1974 Constitution has not continued the provision of Article
XIX, § 9 of the Constitution of 1921 that the jury are the judges of
the law and the fact relating to guilt or innocence. An interesting
22. LA. R.S. 14:20 (1950).
23. 278 So. 2d 485, 490 (La. 1973).
24. 278 So. 2d 485 (La. 1973).
25. 253 La. 992, 221 So. 2d 484 (1969).
26. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 778.
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question arose when the court in Douglas found that article 778 was
not, in fact, unconstitutional after the court in Hudson said that it
was. 7 An even more interesting question arose at midnight December
31, 1974 when the Constitution of 1974 took effect. Article XIV, §
18(A) of the Constitution of 1974, provides that "[1]aws in force on
the effective date of this constitution, which were constitutional when
enacted and are not in conflict with this constitution, shall remain
in effect until altered or repealed or until they expire by their own
limitations." (Emphasis added.)
Courts will have to decide whether this provision fully revives
article 778 or whether it requires the Douglas interpretation to limit
the application of article 778 unless the provision is reenacted by the
legislature. The interpretation was made, of course, in light of Article
XIX, § 9 of the Constitution of 1921, and was necessary to preserve
the constitutionality of the statute.
The issue may never be resolved by the supreme court. If a trial
court after January 1, 1975 directs a verdict of acquittal because the
state's evidence is "insufficient to sustain a conviction," that ruling
is not appealable by the state.2" If the trial court refuses to direct a
verdict of acquittal although the evidence falls within the "insuffi-
cient" category but not the "total lack of evidence" category, the
denial may be unreviewable by the supreme court because no ques-
tion of law is presented.
The writer hopes that trial courts will give full effect to article
778 after January 1, 1975. Trial courts will undoubtedly exercise
sound discretion in taking cases from the jury. However, justice re-
quires that it be done if the evidence is "insufficient to sustain a
verdict."
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
In State v. Jones,2" the court instructed the trial court that when
passing on the defendant's motion for a new trial alleging that "the
verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence,"' 0 its duty is to decide
whether or not the verdict was unsupported by the evidence. The
27. See Note, 34 LA. L. REV. 851 (1974).
28. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 912(B) provides in pertinent part: "The state cannot
appeal from a verdict of acquittal." In State v. Baskin, 301 So. 2d 313 (La. 1974), the
court held that the state could not appeal a judgment directing a verdict of acquittal
in a jury case on the ground that the trial court erred in finding a "total lack of
evidence" and therefore the trial court lacked authority to grant a directed verdict.
Similarly, the court refused to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.
29. 288 So. 2d 48 (La. 1973).
30. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 851(1).
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court seems to have taken the opportunity, since a remand for re-
sentencing was necessary,"' to declare that the trial court has the
authority to grant a new trial if not satisfied that the evidence proved
the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.2 The court felt
that the trial court's denial of the motion for a new trial on the
"verdict contrary to the law and evidence" ground indicated a belief
that "even on a motion for a new trial, the guilt of the accused [is]
a question for the jury alone. '3
The court cited the official revision comment to article 851 which
clearly indicates that the redactors intended to vest the trial judge
with broad discretion to order a new trial "if he feels that the jury
was wrong in convicting the defendant."3
Justice Summers, disagreeing with the majority, felt that the
spirit of Article XIX, § 9 of the Constitution of 1921 was violated by
such subversion of the jury's verdict. He argued that the result meant
the possible trial of a case "ad infinitum until the jury reaches a
verdict acceptable to the judge. '3 While that point should be well
taken by the trial courts, the writer submits that the trial court
clearly must have the authority to upset jury verdicts which, al-
though supported by some evidence, possibly even "sufficient" evi-
dence, are unfair. Trial courts will be hesitant to substitute their
judgment regarding the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the
evidence for that of the jury. However, the trial court has the duty
to do so in cases where it decides that the defendant has been wrongly
convicted. The trial judge is in a position, unlike the appellate court,
to assess all of the factors in light of his wisdom and experience. While
great deference should be paid to jury verdicts, even where reasonable
men could differ on the question of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,"
verdicts should be upset if the trial court feels that an accused has
been wrongfully convicted.37
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO MOVE TO QUASH
In State v. Woodfox, 5 the defendant in proper person filed a
31. The mandatory delay in sentencing provided in LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 873 was
not properly complied with by the court or waived by the defendant. 288 So. 2d at 51.
32. 288 So. 2d at 51.
33. Id. at 50.
34. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 851, comment (d).
35. 288 So. 2d at 51.
36. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404 (1972).
37. The court also has the authority to grant a new trial where "the ends of justice
would be served by the granting of a new trial, although the defendant may not be
entitled to a new trial as a matter of strict legal right." LA. CODE CrIM. P. 851(5).
38. 291 So. 2d 388 (La. 1974).
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motion to quash his grand jury indictment. At the time he was repre-
sented by court-appointed counsel. Later, other counsel was retained
by the defendant. The defendant, tried and convicted of murder, was
sentenced to life imprisonment. No action on the motion to quash was
ever taken.
On appeal, defense counsel argued that the court's failure to
dispose of the motion prior to trial was error patent on the face of the
record. The supreme court disagreed, holding that such an irregular-
ity should have been objected to and a bill of exceptions reserved. 9
The court noted that former article 841 provided that failure to object
and reserve a bill constituted a "waiver of the objection." Signifi-
cantly, the court noted that the defendant was not precluded on
proper showing from seeking relief by habeas corpus.
The court's approach seems eminently correct. By failing to fol-
low the formal requisites, the defendant lost the opportunity to pur-
sue the alleged error regarding the grand jury indictment on appeal.
However, the defendant was not precluded from attempting to estab-
lish the error through habeas corpus proceedings in the district court.
It is doubtful that the waiver provision of former article 841 would
prevent an accused under these circumstances from raising a federal
constitutional right in collateral proceedings." Insofar as defendant's
motion complained of violations of federal constitutional rights, his
failure to object to the trial court's failure to dispose of the motion
prior to trial would probably not serve to waive the defendant's right
to complain."t The procedural default only served to prevent the com-
plaint from being urged on appeal. It did not preclude the defendant
"on proper showing"'" from renewing his complaint in collateral pro-
ceedings.
39. The case was disposed of prior to Act 207 of 1974 amending various articles of
the Code of Criminal Procedures and abolishing the bill of exceptions.
40. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965); Morris v. Sullivan, 497 F.2d
544 (5th Cir. 1974); Marlin v. Florida, 489 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1974); Rivera v. Wain-
wright, 488 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1974); Lawrence v. Henderson, 478 F.2d 705 (5th Cir.
1973).
41. The court did not state specifically what grounds the defendant's motion
alleged: "This motion appears in the record and basically alleges that the proceedings,
investigations and findings of the Grand Jury were prejudicial and unfair." State v.
Woodfox, 291 So. 2d 388, 389 (La. 1974).
42. Id. at 390. By "proper showing," the court has alluded to an interesting prob-
lem. In recent cases the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
addressed the problem. Morris v. Sullivan, 497 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1974); Marlin v.
Florida, 489 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1974); Rivera v. Wainwright, 488 F.2d 275 (5th Cir.
1974). In those cases, the accused, having failed to follow required state procedures in
complaining of the constitutionality of the jury venire selection procedures, sought to
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In State v. Kibby,43 the accused filed a motion in arrest of judg-
ment alleging that the tribunal which tried him did not conform with
the constitutional mandate of Article VII, § 41 of the Constitution of
1921."1 His complaint was that the petit jury venire included women
who had not filed a written declaration of their desire to be subject
to jury service. None of the women objected to service, but, by stipu-
lation, it was agreed that none had filed a declaration of desire to be
subject to service.
The supreme court held that the ground for arrest of judgment45
relied on by the defendant dealt only with "the type of tribunal
(judge or jury)"4 which must try the various types of cases, and
"where juries are required, the size and number of jurors that must
concur for a verdict."4 The court concluded that such a complaint,
if not raised by motion to quash, is waived, citing article 535. 41 Be-
cause no motion to quash was filed, the court held that the alleged
error was waived.
It was rather interesting that the defendant objected to the
inclusion of women who had not filed a written declaration. The usual
complaint is the reverse.49 Nevertheless, the court's treatment of the
attack the convictions collaterally in federal habeas corpus. The court of appeals,
citing Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), required the habeas petitioner who
failed to follow required state procedures to show why the claim was not timely and
properly raised. The Fifth Circuit cases prior to Davis had held that "a jury discrimina-
tion claim barred by a state procedural timeliness rule could be presented initially on
federal habeas corpus absent proof by the state of a Fay v. Noia ... deliberate bypass,
a conscious, knowing and strategic waiver." Morris v. Sullivan, 497 F.2d 544, 545 (5th
Cir. 1974). In Morris, the court noted that "[pletitioners did not allege that their
court-appointed attorneys were incompetent . . . that the jury discrimination was
covert and undiscoverable, or that any other form of 'cause' for the omission ex-
isted .. " Id. Because the habeas petitioners failed timely to raise their claims in
state court or to show cause why they were not timely raised, the district court's finding
that petitioners waived their rights to complain was upheld. Id.
The Fifth Circuit's analysis of the problem should aid the Louisiana supreme court
in determining when "a proper showing" has been made establishing the Louisiana
habeas petitioner's right to avoid the statutory waiver in LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 535(D).
43. 294 So. 2d 196 (La. 1974).
44. La. Const. art. VII, §41 (1921) provides in pertinent part: "[N]o woman shall
be drawn for jury service unless she shall have previously filed with the clerk of the
District Court a written declaration of her desire to be subject to such service."
45. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 859(4) provides: "The tribunal that tried the case did
not conform with the requirements of Section 41 of Article VII of the Louisiana Consti-
tution."
46. 294 So. 2d at 199.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Healy v. Edwards, 363 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La. 1973), prob. juris. noted,
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complaint here is significant. Clearly, insofar as only state procedures
are involved, as opposed to federal constitutional rights, the court is
correct in holding the defendant to the waiver standard outlined by
state lawY° The court's decisions in State v. Kibby and State v.
Woodfox are thus consistent.
ERROR PATENT ON THE FACE OF THE RECORD
In City of Baton Rouge v. Norman,5 the defendant appealed to
the district court following his conviction in city court. During the
second trial, after the city ordinance in question was introduced into
evidence in district court, the defendant moved to quash on the
ground that the city ordinance was unconstitutional. The defendant
was convicted in the district court and the supreme court granted
writs of review.
The supreme court noted that article 53552 requires the filing of
a motion to quash prior to trial. However, the court stated:
[F]undamental grounds such as the invalidity of the statute
upon which the prosecution is based are not waived by failure to
urge them by motion to quash prior to trial. To the contrary, the
validity of the statute upon which the prosecution is based is
'within the scope of appellate review without prior objection,
under Art. 920(2), since it is an error discoverable by a mere
inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspec-
tion of the evidence.'53
The court then proceeded to analyze the merits of the defendant's
contentions resolving them against him.
Because the court was precluded from considering the untimely
motion to quash, the court properly had jurisdiction to consider the
issue only under the theory adopted as error patent on the face of the
record. 5' As the official revision comment to article 535 notes, the
validity of the statute on which the prosecution is based can be raised
94 S. Ct. 1405 (1974); State v. Taylor, 282 So. 2d 491 (La. 1973), prob. juris. noted, 94
S. Ct. 1405 (1974).
50. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 535(D).
51. 290 So. 2d 865 (La. 1974).
52. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 535(A)(1) provides: "A motion to quash may be filed
of right at any time before commencement of trial, when based on the ground that:
(1) The offense charged is not punishable under a valid statute."
53. 290 So. 2d at 867.
54. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 920(2) gives the supreme court jurisdiction to review
"[any error that is discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceed-
ings and without inspection of the evidence."
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in a motion in arrest of judgment.5 5 The comments to article 362
suggest that the unconstitutionality of the statute under which the
accused is in custody can also be raised in habeas corpus proceed-
ings. 51
The court was correct in considering the merits of the defen-
dant's arguments regarding the constitutionality of the statute, al-
though not properly presented in the court below. For the court to be
consistent with its theory supporting the result in Norman, the defen-
dant for the first time on appeal should be permitted to raise the
constitutionality of the statute under which he was prosecuted. Er-
rors falling within the scope of article 920(2) do not have to be pre-
sented to the trial court. As the official revision comment to article
535 indicates, such fundamental questions as the constitutionality of
a statute should be considered when raised, although raised for the
first time on appeal.57
MOTION TO SUPPRESS-STATE'S RIGHT TO SEEK REVIEW
In State v. Mallet,"5 the trial court granted the defendant's mo-
tion to suppress. The state first applied for writs, then moved to
55. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 859(2) provides that judgment shall be arrested if
"[the offense charged is not punishable under a valid statute."
56. LA. CODE CrM. P. art. 362, comment (h).
57. The theory adopted by the court has nothing to do with the right to raise the
issue in arrest of judgment under LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 859 or by habeas corpus under
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 362 because these procedural devices were not used, although
available. Habeas corpus requires "custody." LA. CODE CalM. P. arts. 353, 362; State
ex rel Jackson v. Henderson, 260 La. 90, 255 So. 2d 85 (1971). The motion in arrest
must be "filed and disposed of before sentence." LA. CODE CluM. P. art. 861. Conceiv-
ably, a case could arise in which habeas corpus or motion in arrest would not be
available either due to procedural default in failing to properly file the motion in arrest
or because the sentence did not impose "custody" as interpreted by courts. In such a
case, the supreme court would have to consider the issue on direct review (by appeal
or writs) or leave the defendant without an opportunity to raise the issue. If the
supreme court had refused to consider the matter on direct review and affirmed,
relegating the defendant to his remedy by habeas corpus, such refusal would have been
inappropriate. The court had a full record on which to evaluate the constitutionality
of the ordinance. When dealing with the constitutionality of a statute, however, a
record or showing may have to be established in the trial court without which proper
review would be impossible. If such is the case, habeas corpus is the only appropriate
means to establish a record and present the issue.
Although it is better for all issues to be first presented to trial courts, when the
constitutionality of a statute is involved a special situation exists. The constitutions
have shown special concern for questions of constitutionality of statutes. If the trial
court declares a "law or ordinance" unconstitutional the appellate, and not merely the
supervisory, jurisdiction of the supreme court can always be invoked. LA. CONST. art.
V, § 5; La. Const. art. VII, §10 (1921).
58. 284 So. 2d 761 (La. 1973).
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appeal. The supreme court denied writs and then dismissed the ap-
peal as having been improvidently granted. The court held that the
state has no right to appeal adverse rulings in motions to suppress.
The state's only remedy in such cases is to invoke the supreme court's
supervisory jurisdiction by application for writs of certiorari.',
Article 921(B) outlines certain adverse rulings which are appeal-
able by the state." The motion to suppress is not listed. Although the
list is not exclusive, the granting of a motion to suppress in theory
does not finally dispose of a case, since the states could still bring the
accused to trial. However, in many instances, the state's crucial evi-
dence may be suppressed, effectively terminating successful prosecu-
tion of the case. If a motion to suppress is sustained in a federal
prosecution, the United States Attorney may appeal the district
court's ruling to the court of appeal in certain cases.61 The evidence
suppressed must have been crucial and the appeal must not have
been taken for delay. Louisiana should consider some such remedy. 2
Although the supreme court seriously and thoroughly reviews appli-
cations by the state for writs from rulings suppressing evidence, an
appellate remedy might improve the administration of criminal jus-
tice .
59. LA. CONST. art. V, §5; La. Const. art. VII, §10 (1921).
60. LA. CODE CrIM. P. art. 912(B) provides: "The state cannot appeal from a
verdict of acquittal. Adverse judgments or rulings from which the state may appeal
include, but are not limited to judgments or rulings on: (1) A motion to quash an
indictment or any count thereof; (2) A plea of time limitation; (3) A plea of double
jeopardy; (4) A motion in arrest of judgment; (5) A motion to change the venue; (6) A
motion to recuse."
61. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (Supp. 1971). For an
excellent discussion of alternatives adopted by various jurisdictions, see ABA STAN-
DARDS, CRIMINAL APPEALS § 1.4 (1970): "(a) The prosecution should be permitted to
appeal in the following situations: . ..(iii) from pretrial orders that seriously impede,
although they do not technically foreclose, prosecution, such as orders granting pretrial
motions to suppress evidence or pretrial motions to have confessions declared involun-
tary and inadmissible."
62. There may be a problem created by LA. CONST. art. V, §5 with respect to any
appeal to the supreme court by the prosecution except in instances where a law or
ordinance is declared unconstitutional. This question should be studied if legislation
is proposed.
63. The ABA obviously felt that it would. Citing the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, the reporters' comments state: "The
Commission reasoned that the law of search and seizure and of confessions is uncer-
tain, that the issue of admissibility of such evidence is of great significance to both
prosecution and defense, and that therefore lower court decisions restricting police
conduct should be open to testing on appeal. If such restrictive decisions are not
appealable, the Commission found, prosecution officials would either have to abandon
the practice without an authoritative appellate ruling or have to continue the practice
[Vol. 35
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APPEALS OF GUILTY PLEAS
In State v. Torres,4 defendant entered a plea of guilty to aggra-
vated crime against nature. He appealed based on a bill of exception
reserved to the denial of his motion to suppress a confession given to
arresting officers. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed, refusing to
consider the merits of the ruling denying the motion to suppress. The
court held that the guilty plea waived all non-jurisdictional defects.
The court's review was limited to jurisdictional defects and to the
validity of the guilty plea itself.65 The defendant's complaint regard-
ing validity of the confession, being a non-jurisdictional defect, was
waived by his guilty plea." On the record before it, the court deter-
mined that the defendant's plea was not conditioned on his right to
have his objection to the confession reviewed on appeal. The court
found that the plea was "knowingly and voluntarily made . . . after
full compliance with Boykin v. Alabama. .. .
Justices Tate and Barham expressed the idea that the practice
of permitting appeals of guilty pleas to review evidentiary rulings
made prior to the pleas would "encourage pleas of guilty when the
principal evidentiary issue is disposed of by a ruling on a preliminary
motion and hearing.""8 Such a procedure would facilitate handling
despite the lower court's decision in the hope of a future trial court decision sustaining
the practice from which a defense appeal might produce an appellate court ruling."
ABA STANDARDS, CRIMINAL APPEALS §1.4, Comment (b) (1970).
64. 281 So. 2d 451 (La. 1973).
65. The court has reviewed guilty pleas on appeal from the plea in light of the
standards in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). See State v. Willis, 279 So. 2d
192 (La. 1973); State v. Allen, 263 La. 123, 267 So. 2d 544 (1972).
66. Alford v. North Carolina, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); State v. Foster, 263 La. 956,
269 So. 2d 827 (1972).
67. State v. Torres, 281 So. 2d 451, aff'd on rehearing, 281 So. 2d 455, 456 (La.
1973). However, the court noted that its ruling did not foreclose the defendant from
"seeking further relief, upon proper showing, by way of habeas corpus." 281 So. 2d at
456. This remark was obviously based on the defendant's contention that his guilty
plea was not voluntarily made. The court said: "It is contended by defendant that his
guilty plea was not entered freely and voluntarily. This contention is based on the
allegations that there was a stipulation entered into between the accused and the State
to the effect that the confession was an important part of the State's case; and that
counsel for the accused stated to the court and the State his intention to appeal the
bills of exceptions previously reserved. Based upon the record presently before us, we
do not agree with the position of defendant on this point .... " Id.
The setting aside of the plea on the basis of the non-compliance with a prior
agreement is, of course, a separate matter, having nothing to do with the correctness
of the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of the confession.
68. 281 So. 2d at 455 (Barham, J., dissenting). See also id. (Tate, J., concurring).
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criminal cases where the principal issue is the admissibility of certain
evidence. In these situations both the state and the accused may
avoid the needless expense of trial if the only issue is the validity of
the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress. Such procedures have
been established legislatively in other jurisdictions," and their merits
should be considered in Louisiana."0
69. See ABA STANDARDS, CRIMINAL APPEALS § 1.3, Comment (c) (1970).
70. Although Justices Tate and Barham in State v. Torres expressed the view that
such procedures are within the scope of Louisiana's present Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, the majority obviously disagrees. In United States v. Sepe, 486 F.2d 1044, aff'g
474 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1973) the court disapproved of the use of conditional pleas of
guilty, or nolo contendere to allow an appeal on non-jurisdictional grounds (such as
the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress). See also United States v. Mizell, 488
F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1973).
However, in United States v. Mendoza, 491 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1974), in which the
defendants unsuccessfully moved to suppress narcotics, the defendants did not plead
guilty but followed a different procedure accomplishing substantially the same result.
Defendants and the government filed a stipulation for the trial of the defendants,
"which stipulation admitted in detail all the facts necessary to support a finding of
guilt by the district court of the charges contained in the indictment." 491 F.2d at 536.
In response to the stipulation, the trial court adjudged the accuseds guilty. They
appealed, based upon the denial of their pretrial motion to suppress. On appeal, the
court of appeals, although affirming the conviction, considered the merits of the defen-
dants' contentions regarding the validity of the search and seizure. There is no reason
why prosecutors and defense counsel in Louisiana criminal cases could not follow the
same procedures. LA. CONST. art. I, §17 allows the defendant to waive trial by jury in
all but capital cases. With such a waiver and stipulation, or in addition possibly
submission of the case on the basis of the evidence taken at suppression hearings or
preliminary hearings, the trial court could adjudge the defendant guilty. This would
provide the result sought by the defendant in State v. Torres-an appeal of pretrial
rulings without the expense to both parties of a trial.
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